The Elevated Railway Condemnation Case -- Another Analysis of the Property Interests Involved by Corbin, Arthur
COMMENTS
terms of the inherent moment of the particular offense41 Mlod-
ern development in the classification of statutory offenses should
take place by the adjustment of penalties according to what
may be a changing criterion of expedience and rather than by
ignoring past experience, and substituting in its stead individual
opinions of morality. The moral sense of the community will
be more adequately reflected in the general adaptation of a classi-
fication than in sporadic and isolated personal judgments on
particular crimes.
THE ELEVATED RAILWAY CONDEMNATION CASE-
ANOTHER A"N.AYSIS OF THE PROPERTY INTERESTS
LTVOLVED
IN two previous Comments.in this volume,' there have been dis-
cussions of a recent New York case involving rights to compen-
sation on the dismantling of a part of the elevated railway sys-
tem in New York City. When this system was built, the courts
held that the railway company must make compensation to
abutting owners for interference with light, air, and access. Now,
upon dismantling the elevated structure, that interference
ceases; and the railway company claims a right to compensation
for the retaking of the easements of light, air, and access, re-
transferred, so it contends, to the abutting owners. The trial
court sustained the claim and made an allowance of $750,000.2
The Appellate Division also sustained the claim, but allowed
only $200,000..
The writers of both the previous Comments criticize these
decisions, being in disagreement, however, as to the character
of the property interests and the amount to be allowed as com-
pensation. Both make valuable contributions to an understand-
ing of the problem. With many of the matters there discussed,
the present Comment does not deal; but an additional and some-
what different analysis of the property interests that are in-
volved will be attempted. If this analysis is sound, the railway
company has no right to compensation for anything that is
retransferred to the abutting owners.
Unquestionably the railway company has property that is now
being taken for the public benefit. The question is to determine
41 See PALEY, SUMMARY CONVICTIONS (9th Ed. 1926) 5; Frankfurter and
Corcoran, op. cit. supra note 15, at 926.
140 YALE L. J. 779, 1074.
2 In re Forty-Second St. Spur of Manhat. Ry. Co., 126 Mise. 879, 216
N. Y. Supp. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
' In re Elevated Railroad Structures, 229 App. Div. 617, 2 M N. Y. Supp.
665 (1st Dep't 1930).
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just what is this property for which compensation is to be made.
The theory of the railway company and of the court seems to
be that, when the railway was first built, the railway company
acquired certain easements of light, air, and access from the
abutting owners, paying the assessed value thereof; that these
easements are now being taken from the railway company and
retransferred to the abutting owners; and that the railway com-
pany is entitled to compensation at their present reasonable
valuation.
What are these easements of light, air, and access that were
originally "taken" from the abutting owners? No concept in
our law, as used in specific cases is in greater need of exact and
detailed analysis than the concept of "property." Without such
analysis, the policies that are involved and the requirements of
the public welfare cannot be determined. Analysis does not
determine what sound policy requires, but it is a necessary pre-
requisite to its determination. This is shown by the struggles
and differences of the courts and commentators in the present
case. Easements are only one sort of property; and they must
yield to analysis.
Prior to the building of the elevated railway, the owners of
the abutting lots had easements of light, air, and access. This
means only that those owners had rights against all other persons
(rights in rem) that they should not interfere unreasonably
with the passage of light and air to the lots in question or with
the opportunity of convenient access and approach. An "ease-
ment" is not a physical res; like all other property, it consists
of human relations recognized by the courts. In the present in-
stance, the easements of the abutting owners were manifold
rights against innumerable people, putting upon those people
the correlative duties of forbearance and correspondingly limit-
ing their legal privileges-their freedom of action.
It seems to be the established law that these easements of
light, air, and access-these manifold rights against others-
are appurtenant to particular parcels of land. They are for the
protection of the use and enjoyment of that land and of no
other land whatever; they cannot be sold or transferred apart
from that land; they cannot be held "in gross." Therefore, it
appears that by the original condemnation proceedings, the rail-
way company did not acquire and could not acquire these ease-
ments. This is because they did not acquire the particular lots
for the sole benefit of which the easements existed.
4
4 The trial court recognized that these latter easements "cannot be owned
separate and distinct from the ownership of the land to which they are
appurtenant"; but it failed to recognize that herein lay the key to the
problem of the railway company's right to compensation. Instead, it
confused the problem by continuing to talk in terms of easements that did
not exist.
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By the condemnation process, however, the railway company
did acquire, as against each abutting owner, the privilege of
interfering with his light, air, and access, so far as the main-
tenance of the railway required; and as against the railway
company, the abutting owner lost his right against such inter-
ference. Not only was this not a transfer of the easements to
the railway company, it was not even their entire destruction.
The lot owners still had their easements of light, air, and access,
as against everybody except the railway company; and it was the
continued existence of those easements that gave to the lots the
greatest part of their continuing market value. Who would pay
much for a lot if there. is danger that all of the light and air will
be shut off and all access, even that of the borrowing mole, will
be denied? The easements of the lot owners remained their prop-
erty exactly as before the condemnation, except that one im-
portant constituent element-namely, the right that the railway
company should not interfere unnecessarily with light, air, and
access-was extinguished.
There never was any "transfer" of property from the abutting
owners to the elevated railway company when the railway was
built; nor is there now any such "transfer" of property from the
elevated railway company to the abutting owners when the rail-
way is being dismantled. When the railway was built, the rail-
way company acquired much new property and the abutters lost
some of their property; but the property acquired was not that
which was lost. The State was creating and the State was
taking away. In the railway company it created a "franchise,"
including privileges of using the streets and of carrying for hire,
and rights in rem against all persons that they should not inter-
fere with the exercise of these privileges. From the abutting
owners, it took away their previously existing rights against
certain types of interference by the railway company with light,
,air, and access. The abutters never had the property (called
the "franchise") or any part thereof, created by the State in the
railway company; the railway company never acquired the prop-
erty (called the "easements of light, air, and access"), one part
of which was taken by the State from the abutters.
In the case of a "transfer" of property, the transferee is sub-
stituted for the transferor. The latter's rights, privileges,
powers, and immunities in rcm pass to the transferee. So also
do some of the transferor's duties and liabilities-for example,
the duty of keeping the premises in safe condition and the liabil-
ity to taxation; the analysis of ownership (or property) shows
that it is not in all respects advantageous to the owner. In the
case of such a simple piece of property as a chose in action--
for example, a contract right-its transfer by assignment ex-
tinguishes the right of the assignor against the debtor and
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creates a similar right in the assignee against the debtor. In
the case of the more complex property in a chattel or in land,
its transfer extinguishes the transferor's privileges of user, his
rights against interference by others, his powers of conveyance,
his duties of keeping in safe condition, his liability to taxation,
and the other constituent relations of which property is com-
posed; and it creates exactly similar ones in the transferee.
When the railway was built, there was no such transfer as
this; there was a taking by eminent domain from the abutting
owners, destroying their previous right against interfence-by
the railway company. There was a creation of valuable prop-
erty in the railway company, justifying an assessment for the
benefits conferred by the community. But the value of the prop-
erty of the abutters taken and extinguished by the community
was not the same as the value of the property newly created
in the railway company by the community. The requirement
that the railway company should pay the abutting owners for
the destroyed part of their easements was merely a part of the
method of assessing the railway company for the benefits that
it received from the State; it was not a payment of the price of
property transferred by the abutting owners to the railway com-
pany.
Now the public is again "taking" property, in the sense of
destroying it, except that this time it is destroying the property
of the railway company instead of the abutters. Again, new prop-
erty is being created in the abutters (it is the formerly de-
stroyed portion of the easement),5 although there is no "trans-
fer" from the railway company. In so far as the abutters are
now the special beneficiaries of the destruction of the railway
company's property, it is just to assess the benefits against them
(just as we do the benefits from paving an adjacent street); and
to use such assessment in compensating the railway company
for its loss. This is exactly what was done originally when the
railway was built.
It never was just to assess the railway company more than it
was benefited, or to pay to the abutters more than they were
injured. In fact, the railway company received property that
may have been worth much more than the amount of the injury
to the abutters. If the railway company is required to pay the
It is probably safe to assume, as the trial court did, that upon dis-
mantling the railway the privilege of the company to occupy the streot
is totally destroyed, and the right of the abutting owners that the company
shall not interfere with light, air, and access is recreated. If this is true,
the abutting owners' easements of light, air, and access are restored to
their original perfection by the recreation of the one constituent right that
had been destroyed. If this is not true, there is much less benefit to tho
abutting owners and much less reason for assessing them for benefits
conferred.
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full value of what it got, the amount by wlich it exceeds the
injury to the abutters should go to the community that created
that property, not to the abutters who transferred none of it.
So now, it is not just to assess the abutters more than they are
benefited by the new creation of property in them, or to pay
to the railway company more than it is injured by the destruc-
tion of its property. If the abutters are required to pay the
full value of what they get, the amount, so far as it exceeds the
railway company's injury, should go to the community that again
creates the property, not to the railway company that transfers
none of it.
Originally, it was proper to require the railway company to
pay for the injury suffered by the abutters, because the injury
was a necessary result of giving the railway company the rights
and privileges that it asked (that is, its newly created property) ;
also for the reason that the community had to pay for the injury
to the abutters and it might well be distributed on the large
numbers of users of the railway company who were especially
benefited by the sacrifice.
Now, it may be proper to require the abutters to pay for the
injury suffered by the railway company, but not for the same
reasons. The abutters may or may not be "asking" for the dis-
mantling of the railway; in either case they do not obtain, as
did the railway company, new and effective means of distributing
the cost upon the community or the benefited members thereof.
The community is destroying the property of the railway com-
pany and the community should pay the full amount of the in-
jury. To raise the money necessary for this, it is customary
and reasonable for the community to assess those who are special
beneficiaries of the process. Among these are unquestionably
the abutters. They may properly be assessed by the community
to the extent that their benefits are in excess of the benefits
acquired by other members of the community. Part or all of
this assessment may be appropriated in payment of what the
community owes to the railway company; but the amount of that
debt is determined solely by the value of the railway company's
property that is destroyed and has no relation whatever to the
value of the special benefit conferred upon the abutting owners.
How much the State should charge against the abutting owners
for their special benefit and what part thereof should go to the
railway company is for the State to determine, not for the rail-
way company to demand. As against the abutting owners them-
selves, the railway company has no claim whatevere
6 This Comment deals only with easements ex.tinguished and with rights
and privileges gained by the process of condemnation for public purposes.
No doubt, the railway company could have obtained a greater property
interest by private purchase and conveyance. Thus, it might buy an
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The depreciation in value of the railway company's franchise,
or of the privilege of interference with light, air, and access that
formed a constituent part of its total property, is a matter for
consideration in the condemnation proceeding. So also is the ap-
preciation in value of the abutting owner's right against inter-
ference that is being restored to him, in the process of assessing
his benefits. It is obvious that the value of the privilege may
have depreciated while the value of the right has appreciated.
The value of the privilege depends on the operation of the trains;
the value of the right depends on the uses of the land. If the
company's franchise, including the privilege of interference, had
appreciated in value, while the land values of the abutting
owners, including their easements, had depreciated, the city
might have had to pay a large amount to the railway company,
while collecting only a small assessment from the abutting
owners. If in such case the city must bear the loss, in the
converse case the city should reap the profit.
In cases of a taking by eminent domain, Mr. Justice Holmes
says that the question is, "What has the owner lost, not, What
has the taker gained ?"T This is clearly demonstrated to be cor-
rect when it appears that what the owner loses is different both
in kind and in value from that which the taker gains. When the
State or one of its agencies destroys property for a public pur-
pose, there may be circumstances under which no compensation
at all will be made under our existing law; but in the cases
where compensation is due, it is measured by the value of the
property destroyed, not by the amount by which somebody else
may profit from the destruction.
On the other hand, in cases where the State is assessing a
property owner for special benefits conferred upon him, the state-
ment of Mr. Justice Holmes does not apply. The question now
is, What has the recipient gained, not, What has somebody else
lost?
In many eminent domain proceedings, no doubt the two prob-
lems exist together and both questions ought to be answered.
Very likely, confusion exists for failure to differentiate them, the
abutting lot outright, with its appurtenant easements of light, air, and
access. On any subsequent condemnation of this abutting lot by the city,
the value of the easements, as well as of the lot without them, would have
to be paid. With some of the abutting owners, the railway company had
dealt privately and had obtained from them voluntary deeds of conveyance.
It is believed, however, that these deeds of conveyance by the abutting
owners, not involving the physical land itself, should generally be con-
Ftrued as conveying and creating only that interest that was required
for railway purposes. This would be identical with the interest that would
be created by the condemnation proceedings.
7 See Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 189, 195, 30 Sup.
Ct. 459, 460 (1910); of. Comment (1931) 40 YAi L. J., at 783.
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COMMENTS
supposition being that the two questions are identical and that
the loss of one party is the other's gain. In the case of dis-
mantling the elevated railway, the two questions are not identi-
cal and the railway company's loss is not at all the same as the
abutting owners' gain.
The result reached by this analysis is that although the rail-
way company is entitled to compensation by the city for all of
its property that is taken from it by the city, whether taken
for destruction or for enjoyment by a transferee, this does not
include any easements of light, air, and access to the lots of
abutting owners. No part of any such easements ever formed
any part of the railway company's property. It includes the
property in the elevated structure as a physical rcs, including
easements of light, air, and access to this elevated structure. It
includes the "franchise" (a term as greatly in need of analysis
as is the term easement, for it, too, is not a physical res, but
consists of legal relations between men) ; forming a part of this
are the legal privileges (ini rem) of erection, maintenance, and
user. One of these privileges is the privilege as against each
abutting owner-a privilege that was obtained by condemnation
process, and costing (with respect to all the abutting owners)
some $200,000. Without these privileges the "franchise" would
have been incomplete and ineffective; and there is no good rea-
son for separating them from the other privileges and rights
of which the franchise is composed.
After the court has valued the elevated structure and the
franchise, there is no other property left to be valued. To value
anything further is to give double compensation for the same
thing or to give compensation for something that the company
never owned.3
If the city so desires, no doubt it is possible to make abutting
owners parties to the condemnation proceeding and to assess
them for the benefits that they will derive from the new public
improvement. This is a problem of assessment for benefits, not
a problem of compensation for property taken for a public pur-
pose.
A.L. C.
s The analysis here made is not identical in form with that made by the
City of New York in the existing litigation; but it reaches the same result,
so far as concerns the right of the railway company to compensation for
the taking of its property. As against the railway company, the city
did not need to deal with its power to assess the abutting owners for
benefits received from the recreation of their former right.
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